NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

911 AND AFTERMATH: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS OR CLASH OF INTERESTS?

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Science (Strategic Studies)

of the Nanyang Technological University

By

LTC Gurbachan Singh

2005/2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Abstract

Chapter

1.         Introduction

1.1       911 and Clash of Civilizations?

1.2       911 and the Aftermath

1.3       Objective of Dissertation

1.4       Scope of Dissertation

2.         Clash of Civilizations?

2.1       Definitions

2.2       Samuel Huntington’s  Clash of Civilizations

2.3       Religion as Sources of Conflict

2.3.1    Islam and Christianity

2.4       Critique of Clash of Civilizations

2.4.1    Separation of State and Religion and Tolerance of the ‘Other’

2.4.2    Democratic Norms/Values

3.         Clash of Interests

3.1 Alternatives Cause of 911 and the Aftermath

4.         Conclusion

4.1       ‘Post Cold War Ideological  Interregnum’

4.2       Singapore Experience

4.3       The Way Ahead

ABSTRACT

Contemporary discourse at the end of Cold War is dominated by two propositions. While Francis Fukuyama in The End of History offered an optimistic vision of the future where liberal democracy would constitute the final form of government, Samuel Huntington called forth a global conflict that would arise from Clash of Civilizations. Indeed, since 911 the latter notion has gained substantial popularity.

This dissertation challenges the employment of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis to explain the supposed conflict that is going on between Islam and the West post 9/11.  It argues that 911 and events in its aftermath are not manifestations of the Clash of Civilizations as hypothesized by Huntington and specifically not due to any religious or cultural differences between the two major civilizations. Rather, it argues that 911 and its aftermath are primarily due to real or perceived political differences or clash of interests by various stakeholders of the conflicts. These differences include the almost 60-year-old Palestinian issue, the Iraq War, imposing western-style democracy, perceived or real unjust policies of western countries against their Muslim communities, socio-economic disparities between western and Islamic communities and more recently the clash between freedom of expression and religious sensitivities. These differences have been further aggravated by ethnocentric over-reactions by both communities.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Recognize there is only one race and that is of all humanity

Guru Gobind Singh

911 and ‘Clash of Civilizations’

The end of the Cold War created an ideological interregnum in world politics where political strategists struggled to predict how the world order would pan out with the emergence of America as a highly successful model of liberal democracy and the sole superpower. While Fukuyama in The End of History offered an optimistic vision of the future where liberal democracy will constitute the final form of government, Samuel Huntington called forth a global conflict that would arise from the clash between civilizations. Huntington predicted in 1993 that cultural fault lines amongst seven or eight major civilizations, and especially the West and Islam, are far more fundamental then ideological and political regimes and therefore likely to lead to global turmoil in years to come (Huntington 1993:23). On 11th September 2001 Al Qaeda’s attacks on America’s symbols of military and economic powers, marked the beginning of a series of escalatory conflicts widely believed to be between the West and the Muslim community. Indeed, since 911 the world has faced unprecedented security challenges against extremists from the Muslim communities that have brought to the fore the much debated Samuel Huntington’s notion of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’.

September 11 and Aftermath

After Pearl Harbor, the September 11 attacks where 19 suicidal Arabs flew two planes into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington killing 3000 people, were probably amongst the most dramatic and catastrophic events in the history of America. The attacks, aimed at the heart of America’s economic and military power, have cost America billions of dollars in developing a Homeland Security infrastructure, revamping the intelligence system and waging a global war against terrorism.  This event have changed the notion of security the world over and is likely to remain as the top priority agenda of most nations for some time to come. The question often asked is whether 911 and the events in its aftermath are manifestations of a broader religious/cultural conflict or simply the political agenda of the various stakeholders. This section will briefly trace the events and identify the various equally plausible explanations.

President Bush’s response to 911 was that America has been ‘attacked not because of what we do, but because of what we are’ and  ‘face enemies that hate not our policies, but our existence, our tolerance of openness, and our creative culture’ (New York Times 2001). On 7 Oct 2001, America and its allies launched attacks against the Taliban government of Afghanistan for not handing over Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. With 911 still fresh on the minds, President Bush emphasized that the war was ‘supported by the collective will of the world and help from more than 40 countries’ (Harnden 2001). At this stage, while the language used may have been suggestive of religious/cultural differences, the response targeted against the extremist and therefore enjoyed widespread support.

In 2002, President Bush then turned his attention to Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. However this time around about 750,000 protesters converged on the Streets of London to protest against the  Iraq war which according to Liberal Democrat Leader Charles Kennedy, was based on ‘misleading evidence provided by the government’ (BBC News 2003).  UN’s secretary general, Kofi Annan explicitly declared that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal (The Guardian 2004). The US-led war in Iraq, subsequently suffered a series of setbacks that included the intelligence failures on the weapons of mass destruction widely touted as the basis for the war, the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, the status of Guantanamo Bay detainees, the rising insurgency and more recently a looming civil war in Iraq. The war has essentially served to stoke the perceptions of the Muslim communities that America is waging a war against Islam.  Not only did the Iraq war ‘undermined the war on terrorism [against Al Qaeda]’, according to the counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke, it ‘delivered to Al Qaeda the greatest recruitment propaganda available’ (Kessler 2004).

What may have started out as a radical terrorist action, have since escalated into a global phenomenon that threatens to spread in countries with sizable Muslim communities. Since September 11 and the war in Iraq, numerous other equally dramatic and unprecedented events have taken place in several countries.  These include the Bali bombings in 2002, Madrid bombing in 2003, Turkey bombings in 2003, Egypt bombings in 2004, the London bombings in 2005 and the Bali bombing again in 2005. Of significance was the London bombings which was believed to be carried out by British citizens due to the war in Iraq (Townsend 2006).

Could 911 and more recently the London bombings be symptomatic of a broader phenomenon of the clash of cultures that may be approaching its tipping point? An editorial in The New York Times attributed the September 11 attacks to ‘the contrast between past glories of Arab civilization and its current dismal prospect’ (Editorial 2002). According to Christopher Blanchard, Osama Bin Laden’s Fatwa, first published by Al Quds Al Arabi, a London-based newspaper in August 1996, where he outlined his fight against the ‘American, Christians and Zionist crusaders’ (PBS News 1996) echoed Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, by ‘adopting the sensitive historical and religious imagery of Islamic resistance to the European Crusades’(Christopher 2006:CRS-3). Bernard Lewis in his book on What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response have variously portrayed the Middle East in terms of resentment over the destruction of the Caliphate, failure to separate religion from politics, incompatibility of democracy and Islam, rejection of modernity, unequal rights of Muslim woman, slaves and non-believers and using borrowed ideologies of German Fascism and Soviet socialism (Lewis 2002:31,54,60-2, 84,101). Lewis highlights that from the time of Prophet Muhammad, it has set precedence for the centrality of religion and state (Lewis 2002:101). More recently in 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair also advanced similar notions of civilization differences when he warned that ‘What we are confronting here is an evil ideology. They [extremist] demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Shariah law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate of all Muslim nations’ (BBC News 2005a).

On the other hand, in the video linking the London bombings to Al Qaeda, Mohammed Siddique Khan who is believed to be the mastermind said, that ‘the public was responsible for the atrocities perpetuated against his ‘people’ across the world because it supported democratically elected governments who carried them out’ (BBC News 2005c). The head of the British Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed, also declared that the covenant of security had ended for British Muslims because of post-September 11, 2001 anti-terrorist legislation and indefinite detention of terror suspects’ and it therefore meant that ‘the whole of Britain has become Dar ul-Harb,’ or territory open for Muslim conquest’ (Pipes 2005). Both these rhetoric’s suggest that while there may be strong religious and cultural overtones, the differences may largely be political in nature.

These escalation of the clashes between the West and the Muslim communities since 911 seems to suggest that Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ may indeed become a reality. However other writers have variously cited the Palestinian issue (Hirst 2001), the Iraq war (Hencke 2005), the Western foreign policy (BBC News 2005b, 2006a) imposing Western democracy (Kinsley 2006), and socio-economic disparities as the possible causes for the escalation of the conflict between the West and Islamic communities.

Objective of Dissertation

This dissertation will challenge the employment of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis to explain the supposed conflict that is going on between Islam and the West post 9/11.  It will argue that 911 and events in its aftermath are not manifestations of the Clash of Civilizations as hypothesized by Huntington and specifically not due to any religious or cultural differences between the two major civilizations. Rather, it will argue that 911 and its aftermath are primarily due to real or perceived political differences or clash of interests by various stakeholders of the conflicts. This will be achieved by firstly reviewing Huntington’s thesis and the notion whether religion could be a source conflict between civilizations. The study will highlight that there are more similarities then differences between the two major civilizations and that the vast majority of Christian and Muslim communities have been living together peacefully.  The study will then visit some of the major criticisms levied against Huntington’s thesis and specifically refute the notions that the religious evolution of the Islamic communities have made them less tolerant and less democratic then Western communities. The study will argue that the ongoing conflict is mainly due to political and social differences; the almost 60 year old Palestinian issue, Iraq War, imposing of western-style democracy, perceived or real unjust policies of western countries against their Muslim communities, socio-economic disparities between western and Islamic communities, and more recently the clash between freedom of expression and religious sensitivities. It will also suggest that ethnocentric over-reactions by leaders of both communities have further aggravated these differences.

Scope of Dissertation

Having  problematised the notion as to whether  911 is a  manifestation of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in Chapter 1, the study will proceed to rationalize whether this is indeed the case in the next three chapters. As religion and culture are nebulous concepts, the study begins with limiting their meaning to those aspects highlighted by Huntington that are related to religious/cultural doctrines e.g. separation of state and religion and the extent of tolerance of the ‘other’ and democratic values/norms. Chapter Two will then review Samuel Huntington’s notion of a Clash of Civilizations with the aim of clarifying the essence of his thesis and discusses whether religion and culture could be the primary causes of the ongoing and future regional and global conflicts. In particular, it rationalizes whether and to what extent the differences between the two religions concerning separation of state and religion, tolerance of the ‘other’ and democratic norms/values could be sources of conflict. Chapter 3 then goes on to discuss the alternative causes for 911 and the events in its aftermath.  In Chapter 4 the study will reflect on Singapore’s experience in preventing religious or cultural conflicts in the past 40 years with the aim of drawing some lessons. The study will then end with some suggested way ahead from avoiding such potentially catastrophic conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

Definitions

Now it will be useful to clarify the meaning of a few of the terms, commonly used throughout the study. The ‘West’ or ‘Western civilization’, as per Huntington’s interpretation, will refer to European-American civilization, or more specifically Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand – essentially Western Christendom (Huntington 1996:46-7). Islamic civilization or Muslim community will refer to communities that have embraced Islam and will include distinct cultures or sub-civilizations like Arab, Turkic, Persian and Malay (Huntington 1996:46-7). It is also noteworthy that Huntington’s reference to civilization identities and culture focuses on religion as the most significant determinant.

It is important to clarify that both religion and culture are not homogenous concepts. Most religions have several denominations that could be substantially different while culture is a complex concept that defines and enforces certain notions about behavior, values and beliefs.  Ken Booth expounds that ‘culture embraces different mode of thoughts, implicit and explicit behavioral patterns and social habits, identifiable symbols and signals for acquiring and transmitting knowledge, distinctive achievements, well-established ideas and values, particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems, and significant discontinuities in all these respects as between one group and another (Booth 1979:33). Culture is one of the key factors determining who is whom in the social universe’ (Booth 1979:14). It is therefore very difficult if possible to tease out values or practices attributed to religion or culture.

To remain focus, this study will therefore be limited to Huntington’s broad grouping of religions as per the Islamic and Western civilizations discussed earlier.  On culture, the study will focus on those aspects highlighted by Huntington that could be potential sources of conflicts and those that are fundamental or related to religious doctrine e.g. the belief system, the separation of state and religion, the extent of tolerance of the ‘other’ and differences in democratic values/norms. This study will also only focus on Islamic and the Western civilizations.

Clash of Civilizations

In 1993, Professor Samuel Huntington writes in Foreign Affairs that ‘It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be [the] battle lines of the future’ (Huntington 1993: 22). His 1996 book titled ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ – Remaking the World Order’, reinforced the notion ‘that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilizations identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, integration  and conflict in the post-cold war world’ (Huntington 1996:20). Huntington expounds that these cultural identities are at their broadest level best conceived of as ‘civilizations which have been primarily identified with the world’s great religions’(Huntington 1996:42)

The basis for his proposition essentially stems from notion that civilization identities are differentiated by ‘history, language, culture, traditions and most importantly, religion’ and are more fundamental than ‘political ideologies and political regimes’, that the world is becoming small, that economic modernization is weakening nation states and that there is an increase in economic regionalism (Huntington 1993: 20). Civilizations, Huntington claims, have ‘different values on the relations between God and man, the individual and group, the citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy’ (Huntington 1993:24). Huntington depicts Islamic countries as ‘bloody borders’ (Huntington 1996:46-7) that aspires universalist values and poses a significant challenge to the West. He goes on to highlight that ‘Western [cultural] concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures’ (Huntington 1993:26).

Huntington suggest that America should respond to the imminent clash of civilization by maintaining the technological superiority, enhancing Western unity, controlling immigrations to preserve and reify civilization homogeneity, denouncing multiculturalism as it will weaken the ‘American creed’, exclude Turkey and Greece from NATO, and aligning with Japan, Latin America and Russia against a potential Sinic/Islamic coalition (Huntington 1996:46-7). He argues that ‘Multiculturalism at home threatens the US and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture (Huntington 1996:318). He also warns that the Western universalism is dangerous to the world as it could lead to a major inter-civilization war between core states and it is dangerous to the West because it could lead to defeat of the West (Huntington 1996:311).

When asked by the New York Times correspondent as to whether the 911 crisis had borne out his Clash of Civilizations predictions, Huntington replied that bin Laden had hastened the ‘clash’ and that he was not surprised the hijackers were educated since they were motivated by cultural hatred (New York Times 2001:13). In a December 2001 Newsweek article titled ‘The Age of Muslim Wars’, Huntington warns that the contemporary fights amongst Muslims and against non-Muslims, could possibly lead to a clash of civilizations and highlights that the reactions to September 11 and the American response were strictly along civilization lines (Huntington 2001:14). However, he acknowledged that these fights are not based on belief doctrine but on politics and that the clash of civilizations is not inevitable, because the fights remain dispersed, varied and frequent (Huntington 2001:14). He attributes the on-going conflicts to ‘Islamic consciousness’ in response to modernization, sense of grievance against Western policies towards Israel and the war in Iraq, the high birth rates in Muslim societies contributing towards a larger number of youth getting involved in violence, and tribal and ethnic divisions within Muslim communities (Huntington 2001:14).

Despite Huntington’s post-911 acknowledgements above, it is clear that he has not abandoned the central theme that cultural and religious differences rather then politics or socio-economics will be the primary reasons for future regional and global conflicts. To appreciate whether this is indeed true, there is a need to examine whether and how religions and cultures could be the source of conflicts and then delve into the relevant aspects of the belief systems of Islam and Christianity and identify if indeed there are potential flashpoints for conflict.

Religion as Source of Conflict

According to Reychler conflicts based on religion tend to be deep seated, tenacious and brutal as in the case of Sudan because unlike resources conflicts, there are difficulties finding common ground in resolving such value-based differences (Reychler 1997). However, rarely are such conflicts purely due to religious differences. They are often due to the political agendas of religious extremists or religious nationalists. This section will aim to elucidate whether and why religion could be the source of conflict.

McCormick (McCormick 2006:144) succinctly essentialises the debate on religion and violence that while many may agree with Aruna Gnanadason that ‘all religions have at their center a commitment to peace …[or] a spirituality of nonviolence’ (Gnandason 2004:61-75), they would also acknowledge Oliver McTernan’s claim that all religions have ‘sanctioned violence to protect or promote their own sectarian interests’(McTernan 2003).  Why is this so?

According to Eric Brahm ‘all religions have their accepted dogma, or articles of belief, that followers must accept without question’ that can lead to ‘inflexibility and intolerance in the face of other beliefs’ (Brahm 2005). Juergensmeyer warns that since cosmic wars are wars between ‘good and evil, truth and falsehood’ (Juergensmeyer 2001: 169) such ‘absolutism of cosmic war makes compromise unlikely (Juergensmeyer 2001: 154). The absolute nature religious beliefs stem from the fact that most religions do not have a final artiber present, and therefore take the safest approach of accepting the written scripture as the fundamental truth often without appropriate contextualization. Fundamentalism as defined by Bruce Lawrence refers to ‘the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific creedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognized and legally enforced’ (Lawrence 1989:78). Appleby however argues  that religious fundamentalists are primarily driven by displeasure with modernity (Appleby 2001).  Juergensmeyer extends this notion by suggesting that religious violence provides groups threatened and humiliated by modernity and globalisation, with the means to challenge and replace the authority and gain back their identity and dignity (Juergensmeyer 2003:227-31).

Michael Barkun however objects associating religious violence with ‘fundamentalism’, which essentially ‘arose out of an internal conflict in American Protestantism’ that separated into modernists and conservatives without the use of violence (Barkun 2003:57-8). He argues that vast majority of contemporary groups identified as fundamentalists are decidedly nonviolent and argues that  ‘there is no simple unilinear relationship between violence on the one hand and religious variables on the other and therefore ‘statements about the political behavior of religious believers need to be handled with care’ (Barkun 2003:69). Robert Pape also argues that religious fanaticism does not explains why the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers, and advanced the notion that suicide terrorism is being used because it has worked against liberal democracies in Lebanon in 1983 and Turkey in late 1990s (Pape, R. A. 2003:343). In his recently completed study on 41 Hezbollah suicide bombings, only 8 were Islamic fundamentalist while 27 were from leftist political groups (Pape, R. 2006).

On the other hand, contextualization of religious beliefs to modern times is also extreme difficulty and therefore opens to political or ideological manipulation by extremist fundamentalist or nationalist agendas. Parvez Ahmed, Chairman of the Board for the Council on American-Islamic Relations  laments that ‘there is a general lack of understanding about how the Holy Koran talks about living with others and therefore there is a tendency to take religious verses completely out of context or take them too literally (Schimke 2005).

Religious nationalism could also be a dangerous formula against national unity. Most faiths credibility rest on being the way to God as there is no other way of proving it.  By simple logic, if yours is the way, then you are duty bound to help steer people away from the ‘other’ ways, which just have to be false or evil. The modern networked globalised world is likely to have all types of faith and ethnic groups as citizens of a state. Religious nationalists tend to seek a ‘political entity in which their faith is privileged at the expense of others’ often where ‘religious symbols will come to be used to forward ethnic or nationalist causes’(Brahm 2005). Religious nationalism is likely to favor the majority often at the expense of the minorities’ faiths.   Still, religion is not just a tool for the marginalised or weak. Lincoln  warns that ‘all religions sanction, even enjoin the use of violence under certain circumstances’ (Lincoln 2003:73). He highlights how both George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden have appropriated the religious myth of cosmic war to justify their use of force and enlist allies in a global conflict (Lincoln 2003:20-3).

Islam and Christianity

Having discussed the potential abuse of religion by extremist and nationalist, the study will now specifically examine the relevant values and belief systems of the two religions. Since, according to Huntington, religion is the most important (Huntington 1996:20) source of civilization identity, we will firstly examine the main aspects of the two belief systems and especially those aspects that addresses the use of violence for conflict resolution.

Reviewing a sampling of the doctrinal similarities and differences of the two religions extracted from Islam and Christianity – Similarities and Differences (James Abdul Rahim Gaudet 2006), it will become apparent that they share many common fundamental beliefs and historical origins. Bernard Lewis suggests that with the exception of Christianity and Islam, most religions of the world are ‘relativist in approach’ where ‘their truths are universal, but not exclusive’(Lewis 2002). He argues that while the Jews may have started the concept that there is only one God, the Christians and the Muslims went further to say that ‘there is only one way to that God, ours. All the other ways lead to hell’ (Lewis 2002). Lewis therefore takes the position that a conflict between Christianity and Islam is inevitable, especially since each claims to ‘be the exclusive possessor of God’s final revelation to humanity, and with a duty to bring it to the rest of humanity and not keep it selfishly for themselves’(Lewis 2002).

Similarities

Islam	Christianity
Monotheistic –  God (Allah) is recognized as the Creator.	Monotheistic — God is recognized as the Creator.
God is omnipotent, omniscient, immanent within His creation yet transcendent.	God is omnipotent, omniscient, immanent within His creation yet transcendent.
God makes agreements or Covenants with humans.	God makes agreements or Covenants with humans.
Human beings have a spirit (ruh) which is eternal, continuing its existence after our physical death. As to its origin, the Qur’an says, “When I [God] have fashioned him [Adam] (in due proportions) and breathed into him of My spirit . . .” [Qur'an 15:29]	Human beings have a soul which is eternal, continuing its existence after our physical death
Humans have the ability (free will) to choose between good and evil (obeying or disobeying God, complying with the moral code of the Covenant or transgressing).	Humans have the ability (free will) to choose between good and evil (obeying or disobeying God, complying with the moral code of the Covenant or transgressing)
Angels exist who are the servants, and sometimes messengers of God.	Angels exist who are the servants, and sometimes messengers of God
Satan (shaitan) exists, as well as evil spirits who follow him; they are the enemies of humanity.	Satan exists, as well as evil spirits who follow him; they are the enemies of humanity.
Divinely revealed scriptures exist which are the primary source of religious knowledge. The Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad and it is the final scripture given to man.	Divine scriptures exist which are the primary source of religious knowledge; revelation in this department is finished (there are no more biblical books yet to be revealed)
Miracles occur on occasion.	Miracles occur on occasion.
There are similarities between the Quranic and biblical version of many stories, such as Adam and Eve, Moses and the children of Israel, etc.	There are similarities between the Quranic and biblical version of many stories, such as Adam and Eve, Moses and the children of Israel, etc.
Jesus Christ was born to the virgin Mary.	Jesus Christ was born to the virgin Mary. (Immaculate Conception).

Differences

Islam	Christianity
Do not believe in the Trinity	Christians believe in the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit)
Jesus is a Prophet and a servant of God. Muhammad is also a Prophet and a servant of God. He was the last Prophet sent by God to guide and teach mankind.	As a member of the Trinity, Jesus is viewed as God Himself.
The Quranic teachings in this regard may be summed up as follows: Christ was neither  crucified nor killed by the Jews, notwithstanding certain apparent circumstances which produced that illusion in the minds of some of the enemies; and Jesus was taken up to God (i.e.. God raised him up (raf’a) to Himself.) [Qur'an 4:157, 158 & 3:55 & 4:157]	Christians believe that Jesus was crucified on a cross.
See above.	Christians believe Jesus was resurrected (raised from the dead) three days after being crucified on a cross (Good Friday to Easter Sunday are the days when Christians remember and celebrate this.) Jesus’ crucifixion they believe, redeems Christians of their sins.
All mankind is born pure and he/she is responsible for his or her own sins and not someone else’s.	Christians believe in Original Sin, (all of mankind is held responsible for the sins of Adam and Eve) which only the sacrament of baptism in the name of Christ can expiate.
There are many differences between the Quranic and the Biblical versions in the details of certain Biblical stories.	There are many differences between the Quranic and the Biblical versions in the details of certain Biblical stories.
The first source of Muslim Law, is the Qur’an. The second source of law is the Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, p.b.u.h.). The Hadith literature expounds and explains and interprets the Quranic injunctions and teachings. The Hadith do not contradict the Qur’an in any way.	The source of Christian (or Canon) Law is the scripture, which has been interpreted by the Pope for Catholics; by the Patriarch for members of the Orthodox faith; and by the consensus of the community for other groups. The writings of the church fathers would also be relevant.

Table 1: Main Similarities and Differences between Islam and Christianity –(Extracted from Islam and Christianity – Similarities and Differences by James Abdul Rahim Gauhet et al.)

Mark Jurgensmeyer argues that although, it is unclear whether Christianity sanctions violence, the fact that early Christians were ‘expected to follow Jesus’ example of selfless love, to ”love your enemies and pray for those who prosecute you” (Mt 5:44)’ and therefore prevented from serving in the Roman Army, they were ‘essentially pacifists’ (Juergensmeyer 2003:25). He adds that ‘When Christianity vaulted into the status of state religion in the fourth century C.E., Church leaders began to reject pacifism and accepted the doctrine of just war’ (Juergensmeyer 2003:25) which essentially permits violence based on the notions of proportionality and legitimacy, and which still ‘stands today as a centerpiece of Christian understanding concerning the moral use of violence’.

In his book, Islam Denounces Terrorism, Harun Yahya meticulously outlines that Islam is a religion of peace, tolerance, free will, and compassion and denounced killing the innocent and any acts of suicide terrorism. He uses the following verses to illustrate his point on violence and religious freedom:

…if someone kills another person – unless it is in retaliation for someone else or for causing corruption in the earth – it is as if he had murdered all mankind. And if anyone gives life to another person, it is as if he had given life to all mankind… (Qur’an, 5:32)

There is no compulsion in religion. True guidance has become clearly distinct from error. (Qur’an, 2:256)

If your Lord had willed, all the people on the earth would have believed. Do you think you can force people to be believers? (Qur’an,10:99)

Harun Yahya also clarifies that while ‘jihad’ mainly refers to the struggle ‘against his lower soul’ or selfish desires or ambitions, another meaning of jihad’ refers to  a ‘struggle carried out on intellectual grounds against those who oppress people, treat them unjustly, subject them to torture and cruelty and violate legitimate human rights. The purpose of this struggle is to bring about justice, peace and equality’ (Yahya 2002:52). He emphasizes that Muslims are allowed to wage war only if they are oppressed and subjected to violence (Yahya 2002:49) as stated below:

Permission to fight is given to those who are fought against because  they have been wronged – truly God has the power to come to their support – those who were expelled from their homes without any right, merely for saying, “Our Lord is God”… (Qur’an, 22:39-40)

Karen Armstrong, a former nun and an expert on Middle East history, who says that ‘I always knew that Islam was not a violent religion’, echoes the views of Harun Yahya. For 1,500 years, Islam had a far better record of living peacefully than Christians did. The point is to separate out the extremists we have in all of our monotheistic religions from the mainstream’ (Armstrong 2006:C01). In her book on Holy War, she emphasizes that while ‘the Holy Quran condemns war as an abnormal state of affairs oppose to God’s will, war is inevitable and sometimes a positive duty in order to end oppression but must be conducted in a humane manner’ (Armstrong 1988:25).

Brown highlights that ‘For centuries under relatively benign liberal regimes, Muslims, Christians, and Jews have lived in peaceful harmony (Brown 2003). Empirical evidence gathered by Russett and Fox highlights that  ‘Contrary to the thesis that the clash of civilizations will replace Cold War rivalries as the greatest source of conflict, militarized interstate disputes across civilization boundaries became less common, not more so, as the Cold War waned (Fox 2004:55; Russett, Oneal & Cox 2000:583). Weigel highlights that Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao Tse-tung, Pol Pot and their apprentices in Rwanda maimed and murdered millions of people on a unprecedented scale, in the name of a policy which rejected religious or other transcendent reference points for judging its purposes and practices (Weigel 1991:39). Pope John Paul II together with leaders of a dozen religions, including Muslims, Jews and Christians, affirmed that ‘whoever uses religion to foment violence contradicts religion’s deepest and truest inspiration (Huntington 1996:125).

In summary, while both religions denounce violence, there are certain conditions where the use of violence is justifiable. Both religions makes it a moral duty to defend the oppressed, and if necessary, by the use of proportionate force. While it may be a mistake to brand all religious persons or groups as violent fundamentalist, there is also a need for religious leaders ‘to reflect more critically on their own failure to provide more effective leadership and [be] witness to the true fundamental values of their respective faiths’ (McTernan 2003:xi). It is also important to note that the vast majority of Muslims and Christians are peace loving and that religious conflicts are not on the increase. The discussion also points towards the need to analyze to what extent the contemporary world conflicts are a response to oppression and therefore may justify the use of violence, and to what extent they are anti-modernity designs of extremist groups.

Critique of the Clash of Civilisations

Although Huntington acknowledges that the cause of 911 is more likely to be due to political grievances, he maintains that the current conflicts between Muslims and the West could still lead to a Clash of Civilizations (Lewis 2002:18). Having reviewed Huntington’s thesis and discussed the potential for religion and culture as a source of conflict, the study will now examine some of the main criticisms against his thesis and rationalize whether the two religions are indeed on a collision course. The criticisms ranged from those who have outright dismissed his thesis as generalizations that gave too much credit to the terrorists and tended to gloss over the complex cultural diversities within civilizations, to those who use empirical evidence to dispute his basis for differentiating between the West and Islamic communities.

Edward Said finds it difficult to reconcile that ‘The carefully planned and horrendous, pathologically motivated suicide attack and mass slaughter by a small group of deranged militants has been turned into proof of Huntington’s thesis’ (Said 2001). According to Kellner, Huntington’s work provides too essentialist a model that covers over contradictions and conflicts both within the West and within Islam (Kellner 2002:2). Some of the main arguments against Huntingtons’ thesis are that ‘civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations’ (Ajami 1993:2-9), and that politics continue to be shaped by ‘clash of interests, not of cultures’ (Gerges 1997:76-7, 1999) and where governments pursue state and national interests—not cultural ones (Hunter 1998:167-71).

Others argue that culture is a ‘volatile concept which needs to be reworked’ (William Sewell 1999: 35-61). Edward Said highlights that Huntington’s seven major cultures and civilizations denies the infinite diversity of voices that are incorporated into the larger structures of Islam and West (Said 2001). Islamic cultures in the Middle East are likely to be different from those in Indonesia, Malaysia and India. According to Jeffrey Lantis even ‘Proponents of culture interpretations take issue with Huntington’s reduction of civilization identity to a focus on religion’(Lantis 2002:102).

Some of the most scathing criticisms have come from Ken Booth who suggests that ‘Huntingtons’ thesis is deeply flawed and politically pernicious’ (Booth 1997:425). Booth meticulous argues that Huntington’s thesis is an over simplification of the multifaceted and complex inter-civilization interactions and an exaggeration of the intra-civilization cohesion by citing the examples of the bloodiest within civilizations wars of the European civil war from 1914-1918 and the Iran-Iraq war. He argued that it also ignores the fact that in the pursuit of national interest, shared civilization does not over-ride inter-state enmity as in the case of the Iran-Iraq war and can bring together ‘strange bedfellows’ like Orthodox Saudi Arabia and liberal United States (Booth 1997:426).

Empirical studies by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s and separately by Manus Midlarsky (Midlarsky 1998:485-511) have shown that ‘Muslims have no less democratic ideals than the West and ‘the West is not distinctive to Islam in its faith in democracy’ (Norris & Inglehart 2002:16). Empirical studies by Henderson and Tucker also highlights no statistical linkages between civilizations and interstate wars before, during or after Cold War while for certain periods there was greater likelihood of conflicts within civilization groupings (Henderson & Tucker 2001:317).

Huntington’s recommendations to preserve the ‘West’, by enhancing Western unity, reifying homogeneity and denouncing multiculturism, suggest an ethnocentric bias in favour of America and especially against Islam. It creates an impression that America is the unfortunate victim while the Muslim community is the problematic aggressor.  Ken Booth squarely addresses this issue when he criticizes Huntington of portraying Islam as a uniquely violent civilization, when to the contrary it have had a long non-antagonistic relationship with its neighbors, varied and not necessarily conflictual relationships between Islam’s ‘core’ states and external powers, and a multifaceted foreign policy of Islamic states determined by national interest (Booth 1997:426).

It becomes apparent that much of the criticisms levied against Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis revolves around his notion that the Western ideas of the separation of church and state, individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law, democracy and  free markets do not resonance in the Islamic and the various other cultures (Huntington 1993:26). It would therefore be useful at this juncture to examine in greater detailed these alleged differences and determined to what extent they could lead to the Clash of Civilizations or whether the criticisms against Hungtinton’s thesis were indeed justified.  I will firstly examine the separation of state and religion and the tolerance of the ‘other’.

Separation of State and Religion and Tolerance of the ‘Other’

According to Professor Smith a secular state ‘guarantees individual and corporate freedom of religion, deals with the individual irrespective of his religion and is not constitutional connected to a particular religion, nor does it seek either to promote or interfere with religion’ (Smith 1963:4). This section will examine to what extent Christianity and Islam are separate from the state and the corresponding implications of their respective inclinations.

There are a few major events or moments in Christianity history, that have rationalized its relationship with the state and initiated the different denominations of Christianity, as we understand it today. Stanley Kurtz agrees with Bernard Lewis that some of the contributing reasons for the church being separate from the state includes the fact that ‘Jesus, after all, was put to death by the state, and for hundreds of years after, Christianity developed in the face of Roman persecution’ and ‘Christian dominance in Europe were followed by a series of religious wars which virtually compelled Christian society to secularise the state, simply to escape from never-ending rounds of religious persecution and conflict’ (Kurtz 2002:77). The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty years war, is another event that laid the groundwork for the separation of the state from the dominance of the Catholic Church in the political affairs of European nations. According to Leo Gross (Gross 1948:28), ‘in the spiritual field the Treaty of Westphalia was said to be a ‘public act of disregard of the international authority of the Papacy’ (Eppstein 1935:192). Duane Bratt highlights that while the Treaty of Wesphalia  by itself did not bring about the separation of the Church and State, it started the  process from ‘international control of religion (through the Catholic Church), to state control of religion (through the monarch), to private control of religion (through the individual)’ (Bratt 2005:8). Others have cited the biblical quotations ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God things that are God’s’ (Mark 12:17) and ‘My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence’ (John 18:36) as further evidence for the separation of the church from the state (Keener 2006). More recently, the American form of secularism as enshrined in the American Constitution prevents the government from interfering with any religion or favoring any religion over another. A speech by James Madison to the Virginia General Assembly dramatically swayed support for Jefferson’s bill, which became law in 1786. A key part of the act, Section II (Jefferson 1786) reads:

‘II. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.’

Although the American Constitution is widely interpreted as secular, it does not mean that it is not rooted in morality and religion. Samuel Huntington in, Who We Are, have largely attributed American values to an Anglo-Protestantism culture (Huntington 2004:59). Philip Hamburger argues that the American creed was largely as an outcome of ‘nineteenth-century movement to impose an aggressive Protestant ‘Americanism’ on an ‘un-American’ Catholic minority (Hamburger 2002:191). Weigel argues that ‘tolerance in Western societies is frequently grounded, even today, in religious conviction’ and cites Richard John Neuhaus that ‘Jews and Christians in the West have come to understand that “it is the will of God that we be tolerant of those who disagree with us about the will of God’ (Weigel 1991:29). Many Americans would like to see the Church acknowledged as the historical basis for the constitution. Recently in 2003 Justice Roy Moore, the Chief Justice of Alabama, who strongly believes that God needs to be recognized was ousted for placing a ‘Ten Commandment’ monument in the state judicial building (Robinson 2004).  David Little highlights that ‘President Bush himself has mentioned that freedom is God’s gift to humanity and that the United States is God’s instrument to spread that message’(Little 2005). President Bush has also often invoked the ‘God’s-on-our-side rhetoric’ to justify the war in Iraq (Krattenmaker 2006). Modood highlights that although all western countries are secular, their interpretations and the institutional arrangements diverge according to the dominant national religious culture and nation-state building and therefore makes secularism a ‘particular experience’ (Modood 2003:15). While many Eastern European countries use civil laws to impose religious restrictions, the French system protects religious institutions from the state but restricts public religious expression with the passing of a Bill named ‘Application of the Principle of Secularity’ on 2 September 2004 (Idris 2005:260). The British constitution on the other hand adopts a state religion but also makes provisions for religious freedom of its citizens (BBC 2006:1).

In the case of Islam, Bernard Lewis suggest that the unity of religion and state in Islam originated with Prophet Muhammad himself, since he was both political and religious leader of the Muslim community and has not changed since then (Lewis 2002:18). Adam Sabra disagrees and argues that ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun tried to force government office-holders to accept the doctrine that the Quran had been created in time and was therefore not an eternal attribute of God. The eventual failure of this policy signaled the victory of the religious scholars over the caliphs in the struggle over who would determine correct theological doctrine (Sabra 2003). Sabra also dismisses Lewis’s viewpoint that the Islamic World is bent on implementing Shariah Law as it ignores the developments after the demise of the caliphate and especially developments in Muslim countries outside the Middle East (Sabra 2003).  According to Fuller many Muslims do interpret the Quran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life) to derive the meaning about good governance (Fuller 2002:54). Fuller offers that Islamism unlike past Arab ideological movements, has no centralized leader or central text, does not take a fixed stance regarding the role of government and although the idea of implementing Shariah is very popular, there are many different formulations regarding how that should be done (Haberman 2003).

According to Stephen Schwartz ‘ Islamic Shariah is quite clear on what constitutes a state policy that contradicts Islam: it is one that silences the call to prayer (adhan), and prevents the teaching and preaching of the religion and goes on to highlight that the new Iraqi constitution even bans racism, terrorism, sectarian expulsions and takfir (excommunication)’ (Schwartz 2005:7). Schwartz adds that The Reliance of the Traveller, the widely hailed compendium of Shariah according to the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence, holds that ‘none of the lands to which Islam has spread to and in which something of it remains can be considered an enemy land. There is virtually no country on the face of the earth where a Muslim has an excuse to behave differently than he would in an Islamic country, whether in his commercial or other dealings’ (Al-Misri 1994:s43.5). Paul Marshall, a senior fellow at Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom, however warns that while in present times most Muslims do not see it fitting for the punishment of theft to be the amputation of one’s hand, extreme Shariah Law as originally practiced in Saudi Arabia has been spreading since the seventies and the situation is likely to get worse in the next few decades largely due a better organised radical minority and a fairly amorphous majority  (Sikes 2006:63-6).

The recent case of the Afghan man, Abdul Rahman’s conversion to Christianity and calls for his execution according to the Shariah Law of Afghanistan (USA Today 2006),  highlights the dilemma Muslim communities face when trying to reconcile between freedom of religion and the Shariah Law. This matter is especially difficult for President Karzai since ‘an overwhelming number of ordinary Afghans appear to believe Mr Rahman has erred and deserves to be executed’ (BBC News 2006b) while the West rationalizes as to ‘How can we congratulate ourselves for liberating Afghanistan from the rule of jihadists only to be ruled by radical Islamists who kill Christians? . . . Americans will not give their blood and treasure to prop up new Islamic fundamentalist regimes’ (Washington Post 2006). Andrea Elliot of the New York Times writes that the ‘progressive Muslim scholars argue that the meaning of those laws has been lost over time’ and cites Khaled Abou El Fadl, an Islamic law expert and professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, that ‘The common argument [against execution of apostates] is that it clearly contradicts the Koran, which says there should not be compulsion in religion.’ She adds that ‘Muslim jurists who support the execution of apostates often point to a hadith — a tradition attributed to the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century — in which he is recorded as saying that a person who changes religions should be killed’ (Elliott 2006). While the Afghan matter itself was resolved by declaring Abdul Rahman as mentally unfit and providing him asylum in Italy, the impression that Muslim communities are perceived as intolerance of an individuals’ freedom to choose one’s religion, is likely to remain as a point of contention with the rest of the world for quite some time.

In summary, while both religions may have evolved differently concerning separation of state and religion, there is little evidence to suggest that the majority of Christians and Muslims are intolerant of each other and the other faiths. It identified that secularism is a particular experience and where a perfectly secular society may not exist. Societies that constitutionally separate the state and religion may not necessarily be more secular then those that adopt a state religion. Notwithstanding the imperfections in achieving secular societies, all religions must make it a point to respect the free will of fellow humans. Religious leaders must therefore responsibly play an active role in guiding the masses to uphold certain basic principles of human freedom and encourage mutual respect amongst the various faiths.

Democratic Norms/Values

Huntington has variously identified the notion of democracy as western ideas of individualism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law and free markets (Huntington 1993:26). As each of these areas could warrant a study in its own right, this study will focus on whether the Muslim community hinder the manifestation of these ideals albeit somewhat differently from the West. On the issue of whether these are supposedly western ideals and whether they are themselves flawless or controversial will be left to future more specialized studies.

Stefan Voigt, in his study on Islam and the Institutions of Free Society, highlights that there are a number of impediments to the establishment of core institutions of free societies e.g. the rule of law, constitutional democracy and market economy in the Muslim world. On rule of law, he argues that ‘Since Islam’s inception, three social inequalities have been not only been sanctioned, but “sanctified by holy writ” (Lewis 2002:83): the relationship between master and slave, the relationship between man and woman, and the relationship between believer and unbeliever’ (Voigt 2005:66). On constitutional democracy in Islamic societies, Gellner highlights that ‘legislation was distinct from the executive because it has been pre-empted by the deity, and religion itself was above the Constitutional Law of society’ (Gellner 1994:17) and as concurred by Lewis that ‘In the Muslim perception, there is no human legislative power and there is only one law for the believers-the Holy Law of God’ (Lewis 2002:101). On market economy, while Voigt is less pessimistic, he cites the fact that ‘Islam constrains the degree to which private-property rights can be introduced’ and the increase in transaction cost of circumventing the ‘prohibition of accepting riba (interest)’ diminishes the economy’s efficiency (Voigt 2005:70-1).

Stanley Kurtz further argues that for the Muslim world to succeed it needs to rationalize the place of women, the separation of the religion from state and modernization (Kurtz 2002:77).  By drawing parallels from the ‘West’s feudal and kinship structures that drove the rise of individualist Protestantism, thereby provoking a series of wars between Protestants and Catholics’, Kurtz argues that the Muslim world’s present day problems are because the tribal and kin-based character of Middle East has largely remained intact and prevents any change from taking place (Kurtz 2002:77).

Conversely, Abdelmajid Charfi rightly points outs that ‘Latin America has long suffered under dictatorial regimes run by corrupt military juntas and nobody, at least in the West, has thought of holding Christianity, the majority religion of the Latin American people, responsible for these dictatorships’ (Charfi 2005:67). He also highlights that that ‘the majority of Muslims are living today in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and elsewhere under democratic regimes’ and argues that the ‘negative perception of Islam is without doubt being fueled by ideological rather the religious motives’ (Charfi 2005:67-8). He however acknowledges that ‘Muslim societies have not yet generally succeeded in modernising their production and social systems, or in acquiring institutions that guarantee popular sovereignty’ although his reading of the ‘Muhammedian message leads to the assertion that in dispensing with intermediaries between man and the Divine, and ending the dependence of man on supernatural powers, human beings are enabled to fully exercise their freedom and responsibility’ (Charfi 2005:72). He urges the West to avoid imposing democracy by the force of arms but rather by ‘practicing democracy in their own international relations and the functioning of such institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the UN Security Council’ and by ending their support for dictatorial regimes in the Muslim world (Charfi 2005:72).

Jennifer Noyon further contends that ‘there is nothing in Islam that makes Muslim countries inherently inhospitable to democracy, any more than there is in Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism or other major religions’ and ‘the fact that nations are Muslim should not prejudice our views of these states or their potential for full democracy and respect for human rights’ (Noyon 2003). The concept of ‘shura’ or consultation demands that leaders should not only consult their people but also seek general consent. Abul A’la Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i Islami in India, have argued that if democracy is conceived as a limited form of popular sovereignty, restricted and directed by God’s law, there is no incompatibility with Islam (Mawdudi 1982:253-54).  The Pew Research Center reports that ‘people in Muslim countries place a high value on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, multi-party systems and equal treatment under the law’ (Pew Research Center 2003)

According to Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood anyone wishing to understand Islam ‘must first separate the religion from the cultural norms and style of a society’ (Maqsood 2006). She argues that practices that force ‘women into polygamous marriages, mutilates their genitals, forbid them to drive cars and subjects them to the humiliation of “instant” divorce’ are not Islamic (Maqsood 2006). She agrees that veiling is a complex issue where there is one verse ‘stating that the Prophet’s wives should be behind a hijab when his male guests converse with them’ which some modernists claim ‘does not apply to women in general, and that the language used does not carry the textual stipulation that makes a verse obligatory’ (Maqsood 2006).

Based on the World Value Survey 1995-1996 and 2000-2004 which showed parity in democratic ideals but a wide gap for gender equality in the West and Islamic countries, Inglehart and Norris argue that the true clash of civilisations between the West and Islam is gender equality and sexual liberalisation (Inglehart & Norris 2003:69). Recent events in Malaysia seem to lend support to this notion. Ms Marina Mahathir spoke out against the newly introduced family Islamic Law that favours men, by saying that there is ‘an insidious growing form of apartheid among Malaysian women, that between Muslim and non-Muslim women’ and that ‘the law represent a step backwards for women’s rights in Malaysia’ (Kent 2006). The Muslim Professionals Forum of Malaysia have since defended the law by saying that  ‘Her [Ms Marina’s] prejudiced views and assumptions smack of ignorance of the objectives and methodology of the Shariah, and a slavish capitulation to western feminism’s notions of women’s rights, gender equality and sexuality’ (Kent 2006). Inglehart and Norris also highlights that not only are the fifty Muslims societies highly diverse ranging from strict application of Shariah Law to secular state like Turkey, they are also the poorest worldwide with ‘high levels of economic disparities between rich and poor, the second lowest life expectancy, fastest population growth and the greatest religious homogeneity’ (Norris & Inglehart 2004:50).

From the discussion, it could be summarized that Islam perse is not incompatible with democracy and that the majority of Muslim societies are functioning democracies. While there may be certain obvious cultural differences between the West and certain Islamic communities especially in the Middle East, this does not mean that either form of democracy is superior.  However there exist in both civilizations, certain societies that have evolved as autocratic political systems that adopt certain laws or policies that clearly violate basic human rights.  Unfortunately, in the case of the Muslim communities, these policies or laws often get attributed to the religious practices/norms that have been passed down in those societies where Islam originated. The centrality of Shariah Law, and the rights of women and non-believers are issues that may continue to be potential sources of conflicts.

From the various countervailing argues it could be elucidated that both religions have similarities and differences that could be potential sources of conflicts and peaceful coexistence. While there are extremist groups in both faiths the majority of the Christians and Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people. There is a need for a greater understanding and mutual respect for each other’s values and belief systems. The discussion has also identified that Islam is not incompatible with secularism, while America is not necessarily free from religious influence. Nation states should endeavour to uphold the equal rights of their minority communities and find ways to protect them from the imperfect majority voting system. Islamic democracy should not be viewed from a Western perspective nor should it attempt to emulate the West. Somewhat fundamental to this acceptance is the respect of the free will of individuals to choose the faith they would like to embrace. How the global Muslim community treats the ‘fallen ones’ or apostates, will go a long way to demonstrate how tolerant and respecting they are of the other religions.

The subsequent Chapters will examine in detail the alternative reasons for the escalation of conflict between Muslim communities and the West and possible ways to address them.

CHAPTER THREE: CLASH OF INTEREST

The preceding sections have systematically analyzed Huntington’s thesis and argued why religious and/or cultural differences between the West and the Islamic community should not be viewed as the main causes for the ongoing escalation of terrorist attacks especially those by extremist elements from the Islamic community. While all communities have extremist elements, the majority are peace loving and tolerant.  What then are the alternative causes of 911 and its aftermath? The subsequent sections will make a case why the ongoing crisis is more of a clash of interest then a clash of civilizations.

Alternative Causes of 911 and the Aftermath

Several alternative causes of 911 and the aftermath have been put forward by various stakeholders. While some argue that the causes of 911 and the aftermath includes contemporary political and social issues like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iraq war, U.S. support for some authoritarian and repressive Middle East regimes, the socio-economic disparities between Islamic countries and the West, the imposing of western-style democracy in the Middle East and more recently the Lebanon-Israeli conflict, others suggest certain innate ethnocentric tendencies against the ‘other’ which have manifested throughout history and more acutely in recent years. This section will examine these alternative causes with the aim of identifying the main causes and the way ahead.

Many view the Palestinian occupation as central to the grievances of the global Muslim community. David Hirst argues for the centrality of the Palestinian issue by highlighting that even ‘the resolutely pro-American King Abdullah of Jordan had told the US he doubted New York would ever have happened had it addressed the Arab–Israel conflict in a more serious, less partisan, way’ (Hirst 2001). Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, rationalizes that ‘Under foreign occupation and denied the right to vote, denied the right to run your own affairs, often denied the right to work for three generations, I suspect that if it had happened here in England, we would have produced a lot of suicide bombers ourselves. This is the reality that undermines any attempt to link terrorism such as we recently saw in London to any particular ideology, or to the even more absurd suggestion that those terrorists are against “our values and our way of life” (BBC News 2005b). John Meisheimer and Stephen Walt also recently suggest that ‘unwavering support for Israel and the related effort to spread “democracy” throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized not only U.S. security but that of much of the rest of the world (Mearsheimer & Walt 2006:14). Cohen believes that the acts of the Saudi and Egyptian “19” were in response to U.S. policy supporting the authoritarian and repressive regimes of these countries coupled with a perceived pro-Israeli biases in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Cohen 2001:A9). Indeed the recent hesitation on the part of the U.S. and Britain to seek an immediate ceasefire in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict is only going further fuel the animosity between the two communities.

A 2004 British joint Home Office and Foreign Office dossier titled,’ Young Muslims and Extremism’, identified the Iraq war as a key cause of young Britons turning to terrorism. The analysis stated that ‘It seems that a particularly strong cause of disillusionment among Muslims, including young Muslims, is a perceived ‘double standard’ in the foreign policy of western governments, in particular Britain and the US. The perception is that passive ‘oppression’, as demonstrated in British foreign policy, eg non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya, has given way to ‘active oppression’. The war on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, are all seen by a section of British Muslims as having been acts against Islam’ (Winnett & Leppard 2005). Azzam Tamimi a representative of the Muslim Association of Britain urged British Muslims to ‘Say, ‘No, I’m not responsible for what happened on July 7. My heart bleeds, I condemn it, yes, but I did not make those boys angry. I did not send those bombs to Iraq. I do not keep people locked in Guantánamo Bay and I do not have anything to do with Abu Ghraib, except to denounce it. Politicians, see what you have done to this world?’ (Hencke 2005). The Iraq war and the Abu Ghraib incident in my opinion have seriously damaged the reputation of U.S. and Britain amongst most Muslim communities and have contributed significantly in polarizing many moderate Muslims towards an anti-West stance and even joining Al Qaeda.

President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy states that ‘the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere …..and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty’ (Bush 2002). President Bush’s plan to embark on a decades-long commitment to bring democracy to the Middle East (Bush 2003) carries with it the implied assumption that the Western values of civil liberties, freedom, capitalism and democracy may be the only option for the Middle East. There were strong oppositions to the initial Greater Middle East Initiative by the Middle East countries as it was seen as an attempt to ‘impose Western values and views on the Arab World’ (Ottaway & Thomas 2004:2).  Patrick and Preble of Cato Institute, warned that the ‘Middle East lacks the conditions, such as a democratic political history, high standards of living, and high literacy rates, which stimulated democratic change’ and that the ‘people of the Middle East, not the people of the United States, must make these sacrifices. Indeed, heavy-handed attempts to force democracy upon the region by military conquest will ultimately prove counter-productive’ (Patrick & Preble 2003). Michael Kinsley argues that ‘democracy produces a government that the people—or some plurality of the people—wants, at least at that moment. But it may not produce the kind of government that we wish they would want, or—more to the point—that we want’ (Kinsley 2006). Indeed, as events have turned out through the ballot box, the people have decided that Hamas should lead the Palestinian government while the Shia dominated Iraqi government continues to have difficulties cooperating with the Sunnis and Kurds.

John Raines offers another refreshing perspective when he suggest that ‘It is not the Islamic other but we ‘the West’ who act upon the basis of an ideology that sees our world, the “First World,” as truly first, and thus not only worthy of but in fact demanding worldwide emulation (Raines 1996:39-49). According to Kishore Mahbubani the ‘Western mind is a huge world’ that is ‘trapped in a mental box’ (Mahbubani 2002). Mabubhani was amazed that the West could be taken into believing Francis Fukuyama that ‘the rest of the world would transform itself to become carbon-copy replicas of Western liberal democratic societies’ (Mahbubani 2002). Amy Chua in her book World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, eloquently argues that exporting market democracy has brought about more ethnic conflict, rise of militant Islam and genocides due to domination by ethnic minorities and foreign investors, and therefore ‘much more is needed than simply shipping out ballot boxes’ (Chua Beng Huat 2005:6). Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines democracy as ‘the belief in freedom and equality between people, or a system of government based on this belief, in which power is either held by elected representatives or directly by the people themselves’. The distinction between ‘the belief in freedom and equality between people’ and a ‘system of representative government based on this belief’ is significant as elected government alone cannot represent democracy. According to James Madison ‘if a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure’ (Madison 1788).

Others have identified that economic disparities as a cause for the Islam and West divide. In a study by Driscroll and Holmes involving 88 nations, it was concluded that economic repression does, in fact, breed terrorism (Driscoll & Holmes 2001:A22). Hunter in her book on The future of Islam and the West, argues that problematic relations between the West and the Muslim World are not civilization differences but political differences and economic inequalities between the two worlds (Hunter 1998:167-71).

Ken Booth’s book on Strategy and Ethnocentrism, makes commendable attempts to simplify and provide insights on how culture could affect the handling of conflicts. He suggests that problems in strategy formulation are not with culture itself but the potential for distortions when one is ethnocentric. Booth variously describes ethnocentrism as ‘feeling of group centrality and superiority’ and being ‘cultural-bound’ and agrees that it is a natural condition of mankind (Booth 1979:15). Booth cites some interesting examples of how British went on to lose Malaya and the ‘impregnable’ fortress of Singapore in two-and-a-half months to the Japanese who were opined in having ‘slow brains’ and ‘overtired minds’ (Booth 1979:33). Booth encourages cultural relativism and suggests an interdisciplinary approach in overcoming the pitfalls of ethnocentrism. He believes that to overcome ethnocentrism one needs to study strategic history and social psychology, understanding the cultural and war inclinations of our adversaries and conduct area studies.

Reflecting on 911 and its aftermath, it becomes apparent that to a large extent ethnocentric distortions have been at work from both the Western and Islamic communities perspectives. Tariq Ramadan in his book on Western Muslims and the Future of Islam laments at the ‘fact that the governments of the United States (particularly after the outrages of 11 September 2001) and Europe maintain relations that are sometimes disrespectful of and even clearly discriminatory against citizens and residents of their countries who are of the Muslim faith’ and calls it ‘Islamophobia’ (Ramadan 2004:6). Alatas highlights that  ‘although much of the media in the West claims to be impartial, liberal, free and objective, in reality it is biased, subjective, illiberal, insensitive and intolerant’ and such that ‘some people get alarmed when they see Muslims being concerned about saying their prayers on time, being uncompromising in their dietary restrictions, or being more “orthodox”’. (Alatas 2005:44)

Based on the discussions above, it would be reasonable to conclude that the present day conflicts are mainly due to political grievances that have overtime manifested into ethnocentric polarizations against the ‘other’. This has allowed extremist groups to exploit these differences and portray them as clashes between the religious and culture of Islam and the West. The subsequent coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have only served to further alienate a vast majority of Muslims and according to the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs gave a momentum to the recruitment of Al Qaeda operatives (IslamOnline.net 2006). It is envisaged that Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, the Hamas led Palestinian authority’s financial plight, the Danish cartoons, the alleged indiscriminate killings of Iraqi civilians at Haditha and more recently the Lebanon-Israeli conflict will continue to play on the perceptions of the majority Muslim community and advance the agenda of the extremists.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

Post Cold War Ideological Interregnum

The preceding Chapters have demonstrated that the sudden demise of the Soviet socialist model have not only brought about an unprecedented change in the political power balance but also re-rationalizations on the role and structure of nation state governments with regards to democratic norms, social and religious values and economic practices. While some argue that the ‘classic ingredient of the left-right divide is fading fast’ (Young 2005) and converging towards the centre, others argue that the divide is taking on a  new meaning through the competing rationalization of political, social, religious and economic interest of the people. More importantly, these rationalizations are taking place not only between but also within nation states. For most countries, at the heart of these rationalizations is the desire to strive for some form of emancipation of its people. Is there a way out of this post Cold War ideological interregnum? Extending Michael Walzer’s idea that a “thin” minimal morality does derive from the common human condition, and “universal dispositions” in all cultures, Huntington argues that the requisites for cultural coexistence demand a search for what is common to most civilizations and therefore suggest that the way ahead may be  ‘to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities’ (Huntington 1996:318). He suggests that such commonalities exist in Singapore. To address the way ahead this study will now examine whether and how Singapore’s experience in achieving racial harmony amongst it diverse ethnic and religious groups over the past 40 years could provide some valuable lessons.

The Singapore Experience

“As a multi-racial country, Singapore’s challenge is to channel ethnic pride towards the building of a national identity. This means allowing the different communities to retain their separate identities instead of forcing their different cultures and customs into one common mould. Our approach is like weaving a beautiful piece of tapestry out of different colored strands of silk.

Former PM Goh Chok Tong,

My reasons for choosing  Singapore is mainly because of the success she has achieved in maintaining a good track record of racial and religious harmony despite her diverse and disproportionate racial and religious composition. While it could be argued that Singapore never had any major political or economic crisis that tested its national resilience, her beginnings have had a fair share of racial riots. In 1950, there were the Maria Hertogh riots where Muslim rioters attacked Eurasians due to child custody ruling that left 18 people dead and 173 injured. When Singapore was part of Malaysia, the country experienced it worst Chinese-Malay riots in 1964 with over 36 lives lost and 500 injured.  In 2001 and 2002 the government arrested the Singapore cell of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group that was planning to bomb key installations on the Island.

Singapore comprised of some 77 % Chinese, 14% Malays and 8% Indians and 1%  of others with 51% Buddhist, 15% Muslims, 15 % Christians, 4% Hindus and 15%  of others (SingStat 2000). Throughout the 40 years of independence, the ruling government has been promoting the three basic principles of pragmatism, multi-racialism and meritocracy. Pragmatism, a hallmark of the founding leader Lee Kuan Yew and maintained to this date, and according to Mauzy and Milne, entails adopting the best available course of action and not allowing any option for achieving that goal to be excluded on account of dogma (Mauzy & Milne 2002:52). According to the late Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam the main factors that ensured a multiracial Singapore were de-emphasising the Chineseness of Singapore, according the Malays a special position, establishing a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi–lingual society with equal status, ensuring a fair economic deal for all, providing an administration that accorded fairness irrespective of their ethnic background and creating an English-speaking Singaporean society (Vasil 1995:29). Although Singapore had a much larger Chinese population the National language was from the beginning chosen to be Malay and the National Anthem until today is sung in Malay. The government realized that if the voting system was left alone and went along racial lines, the minority would have been left out of the political process. While viewed with skepticism by certain quarters, the government introduced a then novel concept of Group Representative Constituencies, where a 3-member team will need to have a member from the minority community to qualify to contest.  Realizing that a closely-knit multi-racial society is crucial for long-term stability of the country, the government even made unpopular decisions to ensure the subsidized housing programme had a proportionate mix of the difference races. According to Professor Tommy Koh, Singapore enforces an ethnic quota to prevent any ethnic group from being over-represented in any apartment building in our public housing estates. (Tommy Koh 2004).

Furthermore, in 1970s while the government was achieving a rapid growth rate, there were concerns that Singaporeans was in danger of losing their traditional Asian values through Westernization. The government took active steps to stress on various community values through the introduction of religious knowledge programme into the school curriculum. The government also engaged religious authorities and organizations like muftis (interpreters of Islamic law) and the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore to reassure believers that the religious scripture and practices were not ignored. Singapore’s Presidential Council for Minority Rights and the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony Act were instituted to ensure that no law or subsidiary legislation is enacted, which discriminates against any racial group while the Internal Security Act helps prevent any subversive and communalistic acts.

More recently, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reminded Singaporeans that the government takes multi-racial and multi-religious harmony very seriously, as it is the basis for Singapore to hold together as a nation (Wong 2005). Referring to Singaporeans jailed for racist remarks on Blogs, Mr. Lee said: ‘So whether you do it on the internet, whether you do it in the newspapers or whether you said it in the public or even in the Speakers’ Corner, it does not matter where you say it. This is the message – it is not acceptable. It is against the law and the Sedition Act specifically puts it down that you are creating distrust and animosity between the races, and we will act according to the law’ (Wong 2005).

To summarise, the government of Singapore has taken a largely pragmatic, multiracial and meritocracy approach to achieve stability and economic success in such a short span of time. It had to adopt a judicious balance of at times encroaching on certain civil liberties in the interest of the greater community and at other times even liberalising the showing of restricted adult movies in a generally conservative society. While the approach may not be perfect, it has maintained racial harmony for the past 40 years.

The Way Ahead

It becomes apparent from the various discussions that there are certain realities the globalised world will have to come to terms with. While all religions in the main emphasize moral good and greater tolerance, their absolute nature could serve as a potential flash point or be exploited by extremists or nationalist agendas. While most conflicts are mainly due to perceived or real political, social or economic differences, the ethnocentric tendencies in all cultures could manifest into unjust policies and further aggravate inter-civilization conflicts. It is also apparent that a perfectly secular society may never exist and that western style democracy has limitations in safeguarding minority rights. There is an urgent need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and the Iraq War. We must heed the wishes of the Palestinian and Iraqi people. Boycotting the Hamas-led government will be sending the wrong signal, as the collective whole of the Palestinian community is unlikely to be wrong, while the continued occupation of Iraq will only serve to sow further distrust between the two communities. The way ahead is a pragmatic approach of accepting ideological/cultural diversities and managing the public and private space of religions and societies.

The Singapore’s experience also offers several useful lessons. Firstly, the global community must appreciate that due to the actions of a minority few, the Islamic community is undergoing tremendous pressure from within and without. It is time to provide the community the space to rationalize how best they can rein in their diverse ethnic communities. This is not the time to impose demands or values conformance. Majority religions and communities must volunteer to compromise to win the confidence of the minority communities.  Leaders need to build the trust with its people through policies not based on race, religion, color or majority and guarantee the rights of its people’s religious freedom. Laws need to be in place that guarantees the basic human rights of all its citizens. Governments need to establish mechanisms to safeguard the rights of their minority communities. Special Laws must be in place to protect the public space from extremist religious practices and irresponsible freedom of expression.  While freedom of expression is important, innovative ways will need to be in place to safeguard against any abuse. The governments need to setup mechanisms or institutions to encourage greater interaction and understanding of the different religions, cultures and their sensitivities. Greater tolerance by the majority communities must be encouraged and some form of controls must be in place on religious activities that could create perception of seeking conversions or increasing tensions. All communities must be encouraged to nurture their ethnic and cultural values against social ills brought about by a permissive media or extremely liberal communities.

At the international level, the UN needs to establish some basic human and minority rights code of ethics, which all governments must agree to uphold.  The UN must develop inter-cultural and human rights education curricula and programmes for dissemination to member countries. In his statement on the Millennium Report 2000, Sec Gen Kofi Annan recognized the importance of protecting and promoting minority rights of equality, social justice and fair representation (UN 2000). The UN must also encourage greater inter-faith dialogue and establish a network of theological experts that to help interpret the various religious scriptures and clarify contentious issues that may arise

In conclusion, the study has demonstrated that 911 and the events in its aftermath are not manifestation of clash of civilizations. It then made a case that while religions in the main emphasis moral good and tolerance, the absolutism nature of religions in general, provides a potential for conflict. Governments will need to work at safeguarding the interest of all their communities through laws and dialogue. The study also critical evaluated Huntington’s thesis and concluded that its may have exaggerated the clash between civilizations and unwittingly played into the objectives of the extremist. The study agrees with most scholars, that the root causes of large-scale conflicts are often the political, social or economic in nature. It also reviewed the concept of ethnocentrism, to highlight that it exists in all communities and can seriously affect our objectivity. The West and America will need to reflect on some of their policies and stop exporting their brand of democracy and socio-cultural norms. The way ahead should not be towards universalism but a consensus on some basic human rights.  The Muslim communities on their part need greater internal debates and rationalization as to how it can prevent terrorists from exploiting their religion for political or deviant purposes.

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